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Abstract
A Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system is a contactless automatic identification system that uses small and low-cost 
tags. RFID systems communicate with the tags attached to the objects using radio frequency waves. The major problem with 
RFID systems is the security problem because the communication between RFID components is wireless. In this paper, we 
comprehensively discuss the computational cost and vulnerabilities of the security Protocols on RFID systems. We presented an 
improvement mutual authentication protocol which can prevent the security problems and easy to implement in low-cost passive 
tags, with low computational cost. The proposed protocol is compatible with the international standard EPC Class-1 Generation-2
standard (ISO 18000-6).
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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Malaysia.
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1. Introduction
Due to low-cost, convenience, and efficiency of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems, uses of this 
technology have become an inseparable part in our daily lives. RFID systems consist of three main components: 
tags, reader, and server (database) as shown in Fig. 1. Tags are attached to the objects to identify them as unique
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objects. The tags are containing a microchip and antenna. The tags send and receive data from the reader, which is 
connected to a server [1].
 ServerReaderLarg number 
of Tags
Fig. 1.Components of RFID
RFID tags are generally categorized into passive tag, semi-passive tag and active tag based on their source. The 
inexpensive and smallest tags are passive tags which it is more popular than other types. The passive tag powered by 
an electronic signal emitted by RFID reader. Semi-passive depends on battery to run its own microchip and signals 
are powered by the reader. Active tags are powered by on-board battery. The active tags communicate in a wide 
range because of on-board battery. Active and semi-Passive tags are expensive and contain more hardware than 
passive tags [2, 3].
RFID systems have various applications, such as national identification; collecting tolls without stopping; 
wireless traffic management, automating vehicle parking; automated toll collection, animal identification; asset 
management; airline passenger baggage; animal identification; hotel and resorts; tracking library books; warehouse 
management; smart house; security of items which should not leave the area and a high usage of RFID systems are
in healthcare and medicine [4-6].
The usage of RFID systems is increasing rapidly with products supplied by multi-vendors, requiring a worldwide 
set of Electronic Product Code (EPC) standards. Fortunately, the EPCglobal organization has started to develop 
these standards. Despite this standard initiative, the security and privacy issues with RFID systems are not well 
addressed yet. RFID technology poses several security and privacy threats that could harm its global proliferation 
and usage. International standards have many benefits, such as supporting the proliferation of the RFID systems and 
decreasing the global costs [7].
All ISO standards are required to be available around the world, so users of ISO RFID standards will not be 
worried any more if their systems comply with the different ISO regulations on frequencies and power output for 
each country where business is made. ISO has been working on RFID applications in several areas. The standards 
are divided into four main groups, which are ISO standards for proximity card (ISO 14443) and vicinity cards (ISO 
15693), RFID air interface (ISO 18000), animal identification (ISO 11784, ISO 11785) and ISO supply chain 
standards (ISO 17358, ISO 17363-17367, ISO 17374.2) [8]. Table 1 show different parts of RFID air interface 
standard and deals with a different aspect of this standard and explain how these ISO 18000s work.
Table 1. Different aspect of RFID air interface.
ISO Parts
ISO 18000-1 Generic Parameters for Air Interface Communication for Globally Accepted Frequencies.
ISO 18000-2 Parameters for Air Interface Communication below 135 KHz
(Standard for Low Frequency)
ISO 18000-3 Parameters for Air Interface Communication at 13.56 MHz 
(Standard for High Frequency, R\W capability)
ISO 18000-4 Parameters for Air Interface Communications at 2.45 GHz 
(Standard for Microwave Frequency, R\W capability)
ISO 18000-5 Parameters for Air Interface Communication at 5.8 GHz
ISO 18000-6 Parameters for Air Interface Communication at 860 – 930 MHz 
(Standard for UHF Frequency, R\W capability, also it known as EPC Class-1Generation-2)
ISO 18000-7 Parameters for Air Interface Communication at 433.92 MHz
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2. Related work
In this section, we review some RFID security protocols that are conformed to the international EPC Class-1
Generation-2 standard (ISO 18000-6) specification that uses the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) function or 
Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) function. These functions are used in the tag side to decrease the cost 
of making and using RFID systems. 
To solve the security problem, Chien‘s proposed a protocol that updates the keys to resist replay attacks with the 
ability to save the old and new keys for each tags simultaneously [9]. But this protocol does not cater for privacy, 
and it has database loading problem issues [10]. Lo and Yeh proposed a protocol to improve the Chien’s protocol 
[11], which not only provides forward security, but also provide security against adversarial attack [12]. Against 
these problems, Chen’s proposed a refined protocol to ensure user privacy and security from several viewpoints with 
the proviso to reduce database loading. However, other researchers pointed out several weaknesses, such as tag 
tracking, reader and tag impersonations, and tag cloning [13, 14].
In 2010, Yeh pointed out a DoS attack and database search loading problem in Chien’s protocol and started to 
improve the vulnerability of this protocol. Yeh applied a database index for tags-verification in the first access, and 
for the DoS attack, he keeps both old and new keys numbers, to improve reply attack, forward security and privacy 
in Chein’s protocol [12]. Later then, in year 2012, Yoon discovered that the data integrity and forward security and 
privacy in Yeh’s protocol had a huge security problem, and Yoon began to propose a new protocol that improves
these problems [15]. In 2013, Mohammadali claimed that the Yoon’s protocol had suffered from back-end 
impersonation; DoS attack, forward security attack and data forgery, and he intend to improvise this problem [16].
Both Mohammadali’s and Yoon’s protocols tried to improve the security and privacy problems but still, there were 
vulnerability from some issues like computational cost.
From these two protocols mentioned earlier, we discovered that by adding complex functions and key elements
in RFID components (tag, reader and server side), the security and privacy can be increased. Although by applying 
more Hash functions in the reader and the server side, and applying PRNG in the tag side, could increase the 
security, however, on the other hand, it causes more computational cost. Since, the main advantage of RFID systems
is the ability to read a huge number of tags in the same time (simultaneous identification), it seems necessary to
decrease the identification time and the computational cost of each tags’ identification process. This paper proposes 
a protocol which includes a safe security and privacy level, and concurrently decrease the componential cost on tags, 
reader and server side.
3. Review of Yeh‘s protocol
Yeh (2010) proposed a secure RFID protocol, That notation was used in this paper is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Notations used in this paper.
Yeh’s Protocol, consists a model RR that indicates a random number generated by the reader, which sends this 
number to the tag as a query. Then, RT which is a random number is generated by the tag. The tag computes M1 =
PRNG (EPC  RR) Ki, D=RT Ki, E=RTPRNG (Ci  Ki), then sends M1, D, E, Ci to the reader. Next, the 
reader computes V = H (RID  RR) and sends the tag’s data, together with RR to the database server. The database 
Notations Explanation
i ith Transaction
M Messages
SM Secure Message
RR Reader Random Number
SM Secure Message
RID Reader Identification Number 
RT Tag Random Number
K Secure Authentication key
P Access Key
C Database Index
Info Information of each Tag
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server will then compute the function. The reader retrieves RID which was stored inside the server, XORs with 
DATA, which will be equivalent to the result of the Info, and also, forwards M2 to the reader. Reader shows the 
information of the specific tag and sends M2 to the tag. Lastly, the tag retrieves Pi kept inside to compute XOR with 
the received M2 [12].
If the number matches PRNG (EPCs RT) computed by the tag itself, then the authentication to the database is 
completed, and that the content stored inside is updated as Ki+1 = PRNG (Ki), Pi+1 = PRNG (Pi), and Ci+1 = PRNG
(RT  RR) for the next access. The server also computes V, Ci, Kx and M2 and updates the record. This is clearly 
shown in Fig. 2., which demonstrates the operation of this method [17].
Fig. 2. Yeh‘s Protocol.
4. Review of Yoon and Mohammadali protocols
The next protocol is the Yoon’s protocol, which proposed an enhanced version of Yeh’s protocol. This 
improvement uses the specific functions that are implemented on low-cost tags, by providing the privacy that is
conforming to EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard. Nevertheless, this protocol is problematic with regards to the
DoS attack, impersonation attack, and data integrity. Below is a summary of Yoon’s Protocol [15], explained in a 
step by step manner:
Step 1 (RT): The reader sends RR as a query to the tag.
Step 2 (TR): When the tag receives the message, the tag generates RT and computes M1= PRNG 
(EPCsRRRT) Ki and D= RTKi and E=RTPRNG (CiKi).Then, the tag sends M1, D, Ci
and E to the reader side.
Step 3 (RS): The reader computes V=H(RIDRR) and then sends M1, D, Ci, RR, V and E to the server side. 
Step 4 (SR): When the server receives the message, it starts to compute the Hash function and PRNG function 
in the server side. The server sends M2, info and MAC to the reader side. The server will begin to 
update the secure keys.
Step 5 (RT): The reader computes DATA and verifies the MAC, showing the info in monitor, and then sends
M2 to the tag side. 
Step 6 (T): The tag verifies the M2Pi , if it matches with the tag stored data, the tag begin to update the 
secure keys. 
Now, looking at Mohammadali’s protocol, which is one of the newest protocols that had proposed an improvement 
of Yeh’s and Yoon’s protocols, conforming to EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard; his protocol had used the 
782   Azam Zavvari et al. /  Procedia Technology  11 ( 2013 )  778 – 784 
specific functions that were implemented on low-cost tags. Moreover, if the number of tags increases, it causes a 
problem related to the computational cost and read-cycle. A summary of Mohammadali’s Protocol (2013) is 
explained below [16]:
Step 1 (RT): The reader sends RR as a query to the tag.
Step 2 (TR): When the tag receives the message, the tag generates RT and computes M1 = PRNG(EPCs  RR)
PRNG(RT)  Ki and D = RT  Ki .Then, the tag checks the flag and computes E= RT
PRNG(Ci Ki) Pi .Lastly, the tag sends back M1, D, Ci and E to the reader side.
Step 3 (RS): The reader computes V = H(RID RRM1) based on the reader’s data. The reader sends M1, D, 
Ci, RR, V and E to the server side. 
Step 4 (SR): When the server receives the message from the reader, the server begins to authenticate the reader 
and the tag, using Hash, Keyed Hash and PRNG functions in the server side and update secure 
keys.Then, the server sends M2, info and MAC to the reader side.
Step 5 (RT): The reader verifies the MAC. If it matches with the reader stored data, it shows the info in 
monitor and computes RIDH(RID).Then the reader sends M2 to the tag side. 
Step 6 (T): The tag verified M2 based on the saved value and if it matches, the tag starts to update the secure 
keys.
5. Our proposed protocol
In our proposed protocol, we follow the same steps implemented in Yeh (2010), Yoon (2012), and 
Mohammadali protocols (2013). There are two goals in our proposed protocol: one, to ensure the same level of safe 
security and privacy; and two, to decrease the computational cost by reducing the number of complex functions to 
decrease the read-cycle.
There are three different phases in our proposed protocol, which are the registration phase, the computational 
phase and the updating phase. In the registration phase, all the secure keys are registered into the tag, the reader and 
the server, as shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Secure key registration in our proposed protocol.
The computational and updating phases of our proposed protocol are explained as below:
Step 1 (RT): The reader generates RR and computes secure message SM=PRNG (RID RR), and sends it as a 
query to the tag.
Step 2 (TR): The tag receives the secure message as well as RR, and then begins to verify the SM with its 
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stored data. If it matches, the tag generates RT, and computes M2= (EPC RT Ki)  and M3= 
PRNG (RTCiM2).The tag sends back RT, M2 and M3 to the reader.
Step 3 (RS): The reader sends RID, RT, M2, and M3 to the server side. 
Step 4 (SR): The server uses RID to authenticate the reader. Simultaneously, to authenticate the tag, the 
database uses the M3 to find the Kinew or Kiold and Pi that matches with this number. Then, server
tries to find the Ci, and directly find the tag’s information. The server sends response message 
and Info to the reader side, and then begins to update the secure key.
Step 5 (RT): The reader sends response message to the tag. Then the reader shows the tag’s data on the 
reader’s monitor.
Step 6 (T): The tag begins to update the secure key.
In our proposed protocol, we had reduced the complex functions used in a read-cycle, and had applied the simple 
Hash function (PRNG) to prevent the eavesdropper from capturing the information from the air. Our proposed
protocol is a mutual authentication protocol, because each component is authenticated to each other. Our proposed 
protocol can be easily implemented on low-cost passive tags conforming to ISO 18000-6 standard. The low-cost 
passive tags do not have a battery, as they obtained their power source from the reader. Among all of the different 
types of RFID tags, the passive tags are low in cost, and it runs very simple functions which does not support 
cryptographic. In addition to this, we also provide the same level of security and privacy.
6. Result and discussion
The advantages of RFID systems over barcode, are it consists of read/write data, it can be read by long distance,
it has no memory capacity, it does not need line-of-sight for scanning the objects, and lastly, the most important 
advantage is, it performs simultaneous identification. In RFID systems, when the reader begins to identify the 
objects simultaneously, a huge number of tags (which belongs under the reader’s zone) will transmit their IDs to the 
reader. In this situation, if the complex functions or large number of functions have been applied to the reader side,
then the tag’s identification request time will increase, and the total identification time and energy consumption will 
increase consequently too.
Mentioned earlier, Yeh’s protocol for reading one single tag computes one Hash function in the reader side, and 
7 PRNG and 1 Hash function in server side (if Knew and Cnew). In Yoon’s protocol, we can see 2 Hash functions
compute in reader side and 2 Hash and 8 PRNG functions are called in the server side (if Knew and Cnew). 
Mohammadali’s protocol also applied 3 Hash and 1 Keyed Hash functions in the reader side and 7 PRNG, 3 Hash
and 1 Keyed Hash functions in the server. As discussed before, the previous protocols by applying more complex 
functions, intend to gain a higher security and privacy level. Moreover, by applying more complex functions, this 
does lead an increase in the computational cost of these protocols. However, our proposed protocol applies the 
PRNG function and reduces the computational cost on the RFID components, which can also resistance against 
common attacks. The comparison of functions, which these protocols used during the computational and updating 
phase are clearly shown in Table 3:
Table 3. Comparison of chosen protocol and proposed protocol.
Protocols Server Reader Tag
Yeh Protocol 7 PRNG, 1 Hash 1 Hash 6 PRNG 
Yoon Protocol 8 PRNG, 2Hash 2 Hash 6 PRNG
Mohammadali 
Protocol
7 PRNG, 3 Hash,
1 Keyed Hash Function
3 Hash,
1 Keyed Hash Function
7 PRNG
Proposed Protocol 2 PRNG 1PRNG 3 PRNG
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7. Conclusion 
This paper had proven that Yoon and Mohammadali’s protocols does still have computational problem, as they
had applied more Hash functions to achieve higher security level. However, they did not consider the computational 
requirements and complexities. Therefore, to consider such a problem, we present an improvement mutual 
authentication protocol, which could prevent the security problems and is easy to be implemented. We applied 
PRNG functions and had not used the complex Hash functions, which had caused us to reduce the complexity, but 
we increased the performance of identification systems efficiently. Moreover, our proposed protocol is conformed to 
the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standards and ISO 18000-6.
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